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Abstract In biology, the evolution of increasingly cooperative groups has shaped
the history of life. Genes collaborate in the control of cells; cells efﬁciently divide
tasks to produce cohesive multicellular individuals; individual members of insect
colonies cooperate in integrated societies. Biological cooperation provides a foun-
dation on which to understand human behavior. Conceptually, the economics of
efﬁcient allocation and the game-like processes of strategy are well understood in
biology; we ﬁnd the same essential processes in many successful theories of human
sociality. Historically, the trace of biological evolution informs in two ways. First,
the evolutionary transformations in biological cooperation provide insight into how
economic and strategic processes play out over time-a source of analogy that, when
applied thoughtfully, aids analysis of human sociality. Second, humans arose from
biologicalhistory–a factualaccountofthepast that tellsusmuchaboutthe material
basis of human behavior.
1 Introduction
People change their behavior in relation to what others do. The way in which
individual behavior changes in relation to others calls upon understanding the evo-
lutionary dynamics of populations. By “evolutionary,” I simply mean the tendency
for successful behaviors to increase in frequency.
Understanding the evolutionary dynamics of behavior developed through a long
history of study in economics, in game theory, and in evolutionary biology. The
common theme in all ﬁelds derives from analysis of self interested actors.
In economics and game theory, notions of self interest and utility can be prob-
lematic; the theory applies to the extent that one accepts certain assumptions about
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these notions of the individual. By contrast, a simple measure of self interest arises
inevitably in biology from the basic facts of heredity and reproduction: those traits
associated with relatively less reproduction have been outcompeted and have disap-
peared.Heredityalsoprovidesa clear notionofcontinuitythroughtime,an essential
point in the study of behavioral dynamics.
The clear advantage of biology with regard to the application of evolutionary
dynamics led the great statistician and evolutionary biologist R. A. Fisher to say in
a 1928 letter to Darwin’s son, Leonard:
An engineer ﬁnds among mammalsand birds reallymarvelous achievements inhiscraft, but
the vascular system of the higher plants:::has apparently made no considerable progress.
Is it like a First Law, not a great engineering achievement, but better than anything else
for the price? Are the plants not perhaps the real adherents of the doctrine of marginal
utility, which seems to be too subtle for man to live up to? (Fisher 1983, p. 94)
In other words, evolutionary dynamics of individual interests works beautifully
toexplainbiology,butforhumans,theproblemappearsmorecomplex.Fromwhich,
manypeopleconcludethattheevolutionarydynamicsofselfinterestteachesuslittle
about humans. I draw different conclusions.
On the theoretical side, evolutionary dynamics achieves its greatest development
and clarity in biology, because of the clear notions of self interest and continuity
through time. I will therefore develop the evolutionary dynamics of conﬂict and
cooperation within the biological frame, but in a general way that does not depend
speciﬁcally on biology. The principles should therefore provide a solid foundation
for the application to human behavior.
On the applied side, understanding the evolutionary dynamics of human behav-
ior is not easy, but should not be abandoned. Self interest, for all the problems one
may wish to raise, remains a powerful theoretical framework in which to analyze
human behavior. Several chapters in this book discuss recent progress and appli-
cation. A common view is that, to engineer a social environment that achieves a
certain moral goal, such as reduction in hostility or design of fair laws, one must
understand the social dynamics in play. In fact, engineering and dynamics always
go together: to control the outcome of a system, one must understand the dynam-
ics of that system. By this view, evolutionary dynamics and moral engineering are
natural partners.
The ﬁrst part of my paper, on the evolutionary dynamics of conﬂict and cooper-
ation, provides basic tools that apply across the disciplines of biology, economics,
and game theory. I then turn to a second aspect of evolutionary dynamics: the bio-
logical historyof evolution.How hasthe tensionbetween conﬂict andcooperation –
between individual and group – shaped the history of life?
One may view this biological history in various ways. It may be a source of
analogy about the dynamical processes that govern human sociality, but similar-
ity arises only through a vague analogy of change in populations. Or biology may
deﬁne our history in fundamental ways, because we derive from this history and
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must maintain a sharp divide between biological history and our understanding of
human morality.
I prefertothinkofbiologicalhistoryasbothasourceofinterestinganalogyabout
human affairs and an essential part of our history. I sketch the connections and the
limitations that arise from these lines of thought. I leave the reader with a series of
questionsabouthowmuchbiologicalanalogyandbiologicalhistoryexplainmodern
human sociality.
2S c o p e
Misunderstanding arises frequently with the words “evolutionary” and “moral.”
I delimit my scope before proceeding.
I described two distinct meanings of “evolutionary” in the introduction. The ﬁrst
meaning concerns the change in a population over time. Any economic or game
theoretic study that aims to understand human behavior must, at least implicitly,
be evolutionary. At any point in time, each individual has a certain probability dis-
tribution over possible behaviors. As time progresses, each individual’s behavioral
distribution may change in response to the factors under study. These simple points
alone provide the necessary conditions for the population dynamics of behavior to
form an evolutionarysystem. From a purelylogical or formalperspective,such evo-
lutionary dynamics of behavior do not differ from biological evolution, although
the particular rules of continuity and change inevitably differ between particular
economic and biological problems.
Thesecondmeaningof“evolutionary”concernsthespeciﬁc factsofevolutionary
history. How did humans evolve? How have our brains been shaped by our past his-
tory?What consequencesdoesthat pastevolutionaryhistory have forunderstanding
the behavior of modern humans?
With regard to “moral,” I consider two distinct positions that parallel the two
types of evolutionary analysis. First, whatever one takes to be the scope of moral
studies, most issues concern individual attitudes, beliefs, or behaviors that may
changeovertimeinresponsetothoseattributesinothermembersofthepopulation –
anevolutionaryproblem.Oftentheissueswill turnonsome aspectoflife thatcomes
down to conﬂict or cooperation, and what this book labels as the “global good.”
Second, the particular facts of evolutionary history may help us to understand
the dynamics of moral issues. Such insight may come purely by way of analogy.
For example, the theory of justice introduced in Adam Smith’s Moral Sentiments
and developed by John Rawls forms a very close analogy with one of the funda-
mental processes that shaped cooperation in biological history (Alexander 1987;
Leigh 1991; Skyrms 1996; Frank 2003). Alternatively, and more controversially,
insight may follow from the particular ways in which humans have been designed
by natural selection through our evolutionary history.6 S.A. Frank
3 Evolutionary Dynamics
I start with the simplest force that favors cooperative evolution, the tendency for
similar behaviors to interact. In the second section I discuss repression of competi-
tion, in which reduced opportunities for conﬂict make cooperation the only way in
which to increase payoff. In the third section I consider correlated interests between
individuals, in which an actor places some value on the consequences to those
who receive the outcome of the behavior. In the fourth section I turn to synergism,
the positive interaction or feedback between cooperative behaviors with respect to
payoff.
3.1 Correlated Behaviors and Information About Social Partners
I start with a simple example to focus the problem. Suppose a group depends on a
common resource – the commons. That resource may be land that supports farming
or a forest that supports wild food products. The total success of the group depends
on the long-term ﬂow of goods from the common resource. Prudent exploitation
maximizeslong-termﬂow and groupgood;overexploitationreduceslong-termﬂow
and group success.
A self interested individual gains according to two distinct components of suc-
cess. First, that individual gains a particular share of the local resource. Second, the
value of the individual’s share depends on the total value of the local resource.
The essential tension of sociality arises from the conﬂict between an individual’s
local share and the resource’s total value. An individual always increases its share
of the common resource by competing more strongly against neighbors. However,
increasedcompetitionleadsto over-exploitationof the resource,reducinglong-term
gainand loweringeveryone’ssuccess. Self interested individualstend to overexploit
the common resource, leading to the tragedy of the commons (Hardin 1968).
I developed a simple evolutionary model of the tragedy of the commons (Frank
1994b, 1995a, 1998). This model highlights in a clear way the two key forces that
canovercomethetragedyofthecommons:correlatedbehaviorsbetweensocialpart-
ners and repression of competition. In this section, I discuss correlated behaviors in
termsofinformationaboutsocialpartners.Inthefollowingsection,Ianalyzerepres-
sion of competition as the second key force that can promote group cohesion and
prudent exploitation of shared resources.
3.1.1 A Simple Model
Suppose the world is divided into local groups. Each group has its own common
resource, available only to members of that local group. We seek the behavior
adopted by self interested individuals. We ﬁnd that behavior by searching for a sit-
uation in which, if everyone adopted a particular behavior or nearly so, then noEvolutionary Foundations of Cooperation and Group Cohesion 7
self interested individual could do better by deviating from the population norm
(Maynard Smith 1982).
I measure individual behavior by the degree to which an individual exploits the
common resource. Values range from 0 to 1. Higher values represent greater indi-
vidual exploitation;lower values represent more prudentand cooperativeindividual
behavior with regard to the long-term value of the shared resource.
I seek the population-wide value of behavior, z , such that anyone who deviates
does worse. To ﬁnd that value, I measure the behavior of individuals who deviate
as I   z  D ı,w h e r eı is a random variable that measures individual deviation.
Each individual lives in a local group. If we focus on a particular individual within
a group, and set that individual’s deviation to ı D x, then we can use the theory
of least squares to write the optimal prediction for group deviation, G,g i v e nt h e
individual deviation as (Frank 1998)
E.Gjı D x/  z  D rx: (1)
Wereadthisas:givenanindividual’sparticularbehavioraldeviation,x,theexpected
deviation of that individual’s group is rx,w h e r er is the regression of the average
group behavior on individual behavior. In this case, the regression is equivalent to
the correlation between behaviors of members in a group. This correlation is just a
description of pattern without implication about mechanism: we simply note that,
given a particular individual deviation, the group deviates to the extent that individ-
ual and group behavior are correlated. Put another way, r measures an individual’s
information about social partners given the value of the individual’s own behavior.
Individual success depends on the product of two components. First, measure
an individual’s share of the local resource as f(I,G), where I is the individual’s
competitive grab for local share, and G is the local average competitiveness. The
function f rises with I and declines with G, because an individual’s competitive-
nessraises its local share,andgroupcompetitivenessshrinksits local share.Second,
measure the long-term value of the local resource as h(G), in which long-term
value declines as group competitiveness increases. Thus, we can write individual
success as
W D f.I;G/h.G/; (2)
where it would be better to write this expression as the expected payoff given an
individual’s behavioral deviation, E.W jı D x/, but for simplicity I just write W.
We analyze how payoff changes with individual behavior by
dW
dx
D fxh C r.fhy C fyh/ (3)
D  Cm C rBm; (4)
where subscripts denote partial differentiation with respect to that variable, and
y D rx is the group deviation (Taylor and Frank 1996; Frank 1998). In (3), the
ﬁrst term, fxh, is the marginal change in an individual’s share of the local resource
as the individualbehavioraldeviation,x, changes. This measuresthe direct effect of8 S.A. Frank
an individual’s behavior on success, holding constant how the individual’s behavior
correlates with the average competitiveness of neighbors and the value of the group
resource. By convention, we call this direct effect of an individual’s behavior on
success the marginal cost of cooperation, Cm. In this case, Cm D  fxh,w h e r et h e
minus sign arises because cooperation means a decrease in competitiveness, that is,
a decrease in x.
The second term on the right side of (3) has two parts. First, fhy measures the
consequences of the marginal increase in the group resource as competition within
the groupdecreases, that is, as the group deviation, y D rx, decreases. Second, fyh
measures the consequences of the marginal decrease in the competitive pressure
imposed by neighbors as the group deviation decreases. By convention, Bm mea-
suresthewayinwhichamarginalincreaseincooperativebehavioramongneighbors
affects marginal change in individual success. This marginal beneﬁt term, Bm,i s
weighted by r, because group behavior changes at a rate r relative to a change in
individual behavior. Thus, r functions as an exchange rate between the marginal
costs of individual cooperative behavior and the marginal gains of group coopera-
tive behavior, rendering the costs and beneﬁts on the common scale of individual
payoff.
The condition for evolutionary dynamics to favor an increase in an individual
behavior requires that the change in payoff with an increase in behavioral deviation
be greater than zero, that is, dW=dx>0 , which also means that
rBm   Cm >0 ; (5)
an inequality known as Hamilton’s rule in biology (Frank 2006, see (15) below).
In a moment, I discuss the importance of r, the group correlation. But ﬁrst, I look
at the outcome of the tragedy of the commons in a very simple case.
In (2), let f D I=G, which means that an individual’s share of the local resource
is proportional to its competitiveness, I, divided by the average competitiveness
of members of the local group, G.L e th D 1   G, which means that the value
of the group resource decreases linearly with the average competitiveness of group
members, yielding
W D
I
G
.1   G/; (6)
or
E.W jı D x/ D
z  C x
z  C rx
.1   z    rx/: (7)
With these assumptions, the behavior that, once adopted by nearly everyone,cannot
be improved with regard to individual payoff is
z  D 1   r; (8)
obtained by solving dE.W jı D x/=dx D 0 evaluated at x D 0, as described in
Frank (1994b, 1995a, 1998). Clearly, as the correlation between social partners, r,Evolutionary Foundations of Cooperation and Group Cohesion 9
increases, individual competitiveness, z, declines, or, equivalently, individual coop-
erative behavior increases and enhances the long-term prudent harvesting of the
common resource.
3.1.2 Interpretation of Group Correlation
In this model, the severity of the tragedy depends on the behavioral correlation
between group members. If, for example, group members are perfectly correlated,
then they all have the same behavioral level of competitiveness, and no one can out-
compete a neighbor. If no gains can be had at a neighbor’s expense, then the only
way to increase individual gain is by increasing the value of the common good. As
the correlation,r, betweenneighborsdeclines, opportunityto outcompeteneighbors
rises, and each individual is favored to raise its competitive efforts even though the
outcome is worse for all.
Thismodeldoesnotassume ordependonanyparticularmechanismthatimposes
correlation in the behavior between group members. In biology, the classical inter-
pretation is that correlated behavior arises from correlated genes, usually between
genetic relatives derived from recently shared ancestors. In a simple case, sib-
lings would be genetically correlated by one-half. To calculate r in this case,
note that, in a group of size N, the individual itself composes a fraction 1=N
of the group, and an individual is correlated to itself by one. So, for siblings,
r D .1=N /1 C Œ.N   1/=N  .1=2/.
Correlation does not require genetics and shared genealogy. Individuals may
choose correlated social partners. Individual choice of where to live may be cor-
related with behavior, so that those living in a particular place tend to behave in a
correlated manner. Or, there may be some extrinsic force that imposes behavioral
correlation.
The notion of information about social partners is very general (Aumann 1974,
1987).With genetic relatednessin biology,individualsdonot necessarily “know”or
have direct information about the behavior of their partners. Rather, if an individual
happens to live near correlated individuals, then natural selection will favor those
behaviors that exploit the correlations. By the evolutionary process, the existing
correlation becomes exploited as information, and the resulting behavior is shaped
in accord with that information (Binmore 1994; Pollack 1996; Skyrms 1996; Frank
1998, 2006). In humans, the evolutionary dynamics of behavioral adjustment may
becomplex.But,aslongasindividualsseekselfinterestbysomeprocessoftrialand
error, they may often come to settle on behaviors that exploit existing correlations:
the invisible hand may come to discover and use information about social part-
ners without conscious knowledge of those associations. Alternatively, direct and
conscious information may come into play in some cases.
Thepointhereisthatbehavioralcorrelationsoftenshapeconﬂictandcooperation
more powerfully than any other process. The next section turns to mechanisms that
may escape the tragedy of the commons when the intrinsic behavioral correlations10 S.A. Frank
are low. In that case, some secondary force must impose correlation to bring
individual interests in line.
3.2 Repression of Competition
The simple tragedy of the commons model in (6) illustrates well the great impor-
tance of behavioral correlation. Self interested individuals compete at a level z  D
1 r,w h e r er is the behavioral correlation among members of a group. As the cor-
relation declines, competition becomes more severe, and shared resources become
over-exploitedto the detriment of all.
If some mechanism creates strong correlations within groups, then self inter-
ested individuals naturally adjust their behavior to cooperative ends. In the absence
of intrinsic correlation, behavior tends to be competitive and mutually destruc-
tive. So, in the absence of an intrinsic correlation, what additional force can bring
the interests of the competitive group members into line and thereby improve
everyone’s lot?
One possibility is that the self interested members of the group would gain
by investing some of their own resources in mechanisms that repress competition
in their group. Such policing of competition, by reducing the opportunities for
individual gain against neighbors, would have the effect of imposing greater corre-
lation among group members in the payoffs they receive. As mechanisms that level
opportunities for individual gain intensify, individual payoffs become increasingly
correlated with other group members independently of the resources that each indi-
vidual invests in selﬁsh and competitive behaviors (Alexander 1979, 1987; Leigh
1991; Skyrms 1996; Frank 2003, see these references for connections to notions of
fairness and justice discussed by Adam Smith and John Rawls).
I focus on a simple extension of the tragedy of the commons model from the
previous section, in which I add a second behavioral character that determines the
extent to which individuals contribute their own resources to repressing selﬁsh,
competitive behaviors within their group (Frank 1995a, 1996c).
In the previoussection, I used a simple payofffunction to describe the tragedyof
the commons
W D
I
G
.1   G/; (9)
where I is the intensity at which an individual competes against neighbors for a
share of the local resources, and G is the average intensity of competition within a
group. I extend that model by adding a second behavior expressed by each individ-
ual, A, the amount an individual invests in mechanisms that police and repress local
competition in the group, with 0   A   1. The average investment in policing per
group member is P. With this second character that represses competition, we can
now express individual payoff as
W D .1   cA/ŒP   .1   P/.I=G/ Œ1   .1   P/G : (10)Evolutionary Foundations of Cooperation and Group Cohesion 11
The ﬁrst term applies a discount to individual success for the cost of investment
in the public good through the policing mechanism, where c is the cost per unit
investment in policing, A.
The second term is the individual’s competitive success against neighbors for
obtaining a share of local resources: a fraction P of local resources are distributed
evenly to all group members, where 0   P   1 is the average level of investmentin
themechanismsthat represscompetition;a fraction1 P of localresourcesremains
available for splitting by competitive interactions, of which the focal individual
acquires its share in proportion to I=G, given by the relative competitiveness of an
individual, I, compared with the average level of competitiveness in the group, G.
The third term quantiﬁes the long-term value of the shared resource. As before,
the resource value declines with local competition. In this case, G is the average
latent competitiveness of individuals, but only a fraction 1   P of that competitive-
ness can be expressed, because local policing represses a fraction P of competitive
behavior.
We need to ﬁnd the values of the two behaviors, competitiveness and policing,
such that when the population adopts the values .z ;a  /, no individualthat deviates
can do better. I discussed the details in Frank (1995a, 1996c); here I give a brief
summary. As before, the correlations in behavior among group members play a key
role. Here, rz is the correlation in competitive values between a randomly chosen
individualand the group average, and ra is the correlation in the amount invested in
policing between a randomly chosen group member and the group average.
With regard to competitive behavior, self interested individuals are favored to
express a level
z  D
1   rz
1   a .1   rz/
: (11)
The numeratoris the solution forthe simple tragedyof the commonsmodelasgiven
in (8). The denominator term, a .1   rz/, accounts for the amount of competition
that is repressed, expressed as uncorrelated behavior 1 rz that is repressed at a
level a ; this amount of reduced competition does not lower the long-term value of
the shared resource. In this simple model, competition has a cost only through its
affect on the value of the shared resource. So as mechanisms that repress expres-
sion of competition rise, the competitive tendency of individuals also rises. As I
mentioned in Frank (1996c):
The high competitiveness in a policing situation is no different from high internal pressure
in a ﬁsh that lives at great depth. The ﬁsh brought to the surface explodes; intense compe-
tition and avoidance of repressive policing cause chaos when the same amount of energy is
devoted to competition in the absence of repressive policing.
We might add an additional direct cost of competitiveness, as in Frank (1996c),
but I do not include that here.
With regard to repression of competition, self interested individuals are favored
to invest in policing the group at a level
a  D
ra.1   rz/   crz
cra.1   rz/
D
1
c
 
rz
ra.1   rz/
; (12)12 S.A. Frank
with the constraint that 0   a    1. The investment in policing to enforce group
cohesion: declines with cost of effective repression, c; declines with the intrinsic
correlation in competitive behavior, rz, because increased competitive correlation
reduces the ability of one individual to outcompete another and thus favors indi-
viduals to reduce their competitive tendencies without repression; and rises with
the intrinsic correlation in investment in policing, ra, because greater correlation
reducesthe loss an individualpaysrelative to neighborsfor contributionto policing.
This simple model captures well how two opposing behaviors together shape the
nature of group cohesion. On the one hand, individual competition within groups
inevitably leads to the tragedy of the commons unless checked by some opposing
force. Intrinsic correlation in the competitive tendency between group members, rz,
can alleviate the tragedy, because correlated group members cannot outcompete
their neighbors and so gain by lowering their competitive tendencies. On the other
hand, if the intrinsic correlation in competitive behavior is low, then selﬁsh indi-
viduals are often favored to contribute to their own good by preventing the local
devastation of their shared resource. They may accomplish this by investing in
mechanisms that repress local competition, such as aspects of policing behavior.
The two distinct behaviors – individual competitiveness and contribution to
group mechanisms that suppress competition – lead to an interesting duality in
individual behavior. The most competitive groups, with low intrinsic correlation,
rz, between group members, most strongly favor competitive individuals to con-
tribute resources to the group good through investment in the policing mecha-
nisms. Increased policing favors individuals to become even more competitive,
becausecompetitionis oftensuppressedas fewersharedresourcesbecomeavailable
for open competition. So behavioral dynamics tend to favor both greater contri-
bution to policing mechanisms that promote the global good by preserving the
shared resource and greater competitiveness of individuals.Ultimately, the outcome
depends on c, how costly it is to develop an effective mechanism to repress compe-
tition, and on the intrinsic correlations in behavior that tie the success of individuals
to other members of the group.
We may think of repression of competition as a mechanism that enhances local
correlation. In a group that invests a  to suppress competition, the effective correla-
tion in competitive behavior between group members becomes a  C .1   a /rz.
In words, a fraction a  of local resources is distributed fairly and without dis-
ruptive competition that degrades the common resource, and a fraction 1   a  of
local resources remains available for local and destructive competition. Among that
open fraction, 1   a , the intrinsic correlation rz comes into play, leading to overall
correlation in competitive success against neighbors as express by a  C .1  a /rz.
In the modelshere, I haveassumedthat eachgroupmemberbeginswith the same
amount of resources. Interestingly, if individuals vary in their available resources,
even by small amounts, behavior tends to diverge between individuals (Frank
1996c). The relatively stronger individuals allocate much of their excess resources
in policing mechanismsthat promote the globalgood,whereas relatively weak indi-
viduals allocate nothing to policing mechanisms that preserve shared resources.Evolutionary Foundations of Cooperation and Group Cohesion 13
Put another way, small variations in individual resources cause the well endowed
to take over social control.
3.3 Correlated Interests
The previous sections focused on correlated behaviors. Such correlation plays a
particularly important role when the individuals under study take actions and also
receive the consequencesof similar actions by others. Typical games, the tragedy of
the commons, and mutual coercion fall into this class in which individuals are both
actors and recipients.
In many behavioral situations, an individual acts to affect a recipient, but the
recipient does not take any action. For example, an individual may provide aid to a
brother or offspring without reciprocation. Theories based on correlated behaviors
do not apply in these sorts of one-sided interactions. So, how may we account for
altruistic behaviors in these cases?
Presumably, an actor who makes a costly behavior in favor of a recipient must
value the recipient’s interests. In biology, we have an extensive theory by which
we can calculate how much an actor values different recipients (Frank 1998). In
this case, individuals do not consciously put different values on different recipients.
Instead,naturalselection shapesthe behaviorsofactorsin relationto differentrecip-
ients. Outside of a biological framework, no theory provides an absolute basis for
assigning relative values. Because I focus in this section on general forms of the
theory that transcend biology, I limit my discussion here to how we may describe
relative valuation between actors and recipients, without regardto what causes such
valuations.
Suppose that, in valuing the total payoff to an individual in return for some
behavior, z, we consider the individual’s relative regard for others and self as
W.z/ D vWo.z/ C Ws.z/; (13)
where Wo is the valuation of others affected by an actor’s behavior, Ws is the val-
uation to self as a consequence of an actor’s behavior, and v is an exchange rate
between self valuation and valuation of others in a particular behavioral situation.
The change in an actor’s total valuation in return for a small change in behavior can
be written as dW= dz, and, using primes to denote differentiation with respect to z,
we maywrite theconditionforanincreasein the particularbehaviortobe favoredas
W 0 D vW 0
o C W 0
s >0 : (14)
It is often useful to write this condition equivalently as
vBm   Cm >0 ; (15)14 S.A. Frank
where Bm is the marginal beneﬁt to the recipient, and Cm is the marginal cost to the
actor. The behavior is favored when the value-weighted marginal beneﬁts to others
are greater than the marginal costs to self. We could apply this method of valuation
to any sort of game or economic analysis of self interest.
In biology, the condition in (15) for a behavior to be favored by natural selection
is known as Hamilton’s rule (Hamilton 1970). The identical form of (5) misleads
(Frank 1998, 2006). In (5), r measures the effect of behavioral correlation between
neighbors on the direct success of the actor. The correlation may arise by genetic
similarity, but other processes that impose correlation work in the same way. By
contrast, v in (15) measures an actor’s regard for the success of a recipient of the
behavior – often, the recipient does not express any behavior in return and has no
direct affect on the actor. Biology values v by the genetic similarity of the actor to
the recipient.
3.4 Synergism and the Origin of Mutually Beneﬁcial Behaviors
Different groups with complementary skills or resources can achieve synergistic
gains by cooperating. However, if few tend to join cooperative ventures, then an
individual who puts forward its potentially complementary resource may end up
losing that resource. By contrast, if everyone tends to join synergistic activities,
then no one gains by withholding their complementary skill, and cooperation is
easily maintained. In this case, the difﬁculty concerns how to start synergistic part-
nerships which, once they become common, are easily maintained by advantagesto
self interested individuals (Axelrod and Hamilton 1981).
Much of the cooperativestructure of life in biologyand in humanbehavior arises
from such synergistic interactions. The positive feedbacks and consistency of coop-
eration often become so deeply embedded that their very existence can be difﬁcult
to discern. The more cooperative and nonvarying the interaction, the less one tends
to notice it.
For example, many animals depend on the numerous bacteria that they carry in
their bodies: the bacteria provideessential dietaryproductsto the host. The bacteria,
in turn, sometimes cannotlive without their hosts. This modern synergismis easy to
understand: mutual dependence and mutual gain, although the potential for conﬂict
remains within the alliance. In humans, specialized production and trade engen-
ders mutual dependence and enhanced alliance; subsequent conﬂict runs within the
constraints of synergistic beneﬁts.
How do transitions occur between an initially uncooperativesituation and a ﬁnal
situation in which cooperation reigns? Often, in the initially uncooperative state,
no one gains by offering their special skills or resources if the behavioral or struc-
tural situation does not return synergistically matching skills or resources. So, the
difﬁculty is how to get things started.
The transition from an initially uncooperative state to a cooperative one often
turns on the behavioral correlation between potential partners (Axelrod andEvolutionary Foundations of Cooperation and Group Cohesion 15
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Fig. 1 Matrix for a two-player game. The cells show the payoff to player I given strategies by
two players in an encounter. The C and D strategies correspond to cooperation and defection. The
payoff to player II in this symmetric game can be obtained by transposing the matrix. I assume
a>1
Hamilton 1981). For example, if cooperation is rare, but the behavioral correlation
is high, then those rare individuals who tend to cooperate will often meet cooper-
ative partners, and so mutually beneﬁcial synergism can get started. As before, the
cause of such correlation does not matter: cooperative individuals may be able to
recognize each other and seek each other, or the few cooperative individuals may
for accidental reasons tend to live near each other.
A simple game captures the way in which behavioral correlations inﬂuence
transitions from uncooperative beginnings to synergistically cooperative and mutu-
ally beneﬁcial social structures (Frank 1998). Consider, for example, a particular
interaction between an individual from group I and an individual from group II.
The game matrix in Fig.1 shows the payoffs for three different outcomes. First,
an individual keeps the initial resource if it does not enter a joint venture with a
potential partner. In the ﬁgure, withholding cooperative behavior is the D or defect
strategy. A defector keeps the initial resource, in this case equal to a payoff of
one unit, no matter what the partner does. Second, if an individual puts forward
its resource in the C or cooperative strategy, and the partner does not reciprocate,
then the individual loses its resource and receives a payoff of zero. Third, if both
cooperate, then both gain the synergistic beneﬁts with a payoff of a>1 .
In a particular encounter, player I cooperates with probability p, and player II
cooperates with probability q (mixed strategies allowed). The payoff to player I is
w.p;q/ D 1 C p.aq   1/; (16)
and the payoff to player II is w.q;p/ by the symmetry of the payoff structure. Here,
the players are drawn from separate populations, with average strategies p and q,
respectively.
From (16), we can see that player I is favored to increase its level of cooperation,
p, when, on average,
q>1 = a : (17)
To understand this condition, we must consider what informationplayer I has about
the expected behavior, q, of its partner, player II.
Player I has information about player II’s strategy to the extent that interacting
pairs have correlated behaviors. Suppose p deviates from its population average by16 S.A. Frank
ı D p   p. Then we can describe the information player I has about the expected
behavioral deviation of its partner by a regression equation
E.qjp/  q D rı; (18)
wherer isaregressioncoefﬁcient,becausetheplayersaredrawnfromdifferentpop-
ulations (Frank 1994a).Given this regression equation,we can express the expected
value of player II’s behavior given information about player I’s behavior as q C rı,
and so the condition in (17) for player I to be favored to increase its cooperative
behavior becomes
q C rı >1=a: (19)
If we start with the absence of cooperation, p D q D 0, then full cooperation can
spread only when
r>1 = a : (20)
Thus, a signiﬁcant behavioral correlation is needed to make the transition to a coop-
erative state. Once the populations have moved to full cooperation, they gain from
synergistic beneﬁts because a>1 . At that point, no correlation is needed to main-
tain cooperation. Thus, correlation drives the initial transition, but does not play a
role in subsequent maintenance.
With full cooperation, each population may become dependent on the skills and
resources of its partner population. At that point, mutual dependence causes coop-
eration to become essentially irreversible (Frank 1995b). Much of cooperation and
the evolution of social structure may follow such a path, through which brief peri-
ods of information about social partners allow mutually beneﬁcial traits to ﬂourish.
As those traits ﬂourish, they become embedded in the structure of opportunities
available and payoffs gained. Such traits of mutual dependence may come to seem
more as ﬁxed aspects of the social environment than as interesting characteristics
reﬂecting the social tension between cooperation and conﬂict.
4 Biological History
Some people may believe that biological history can teach us little about our own
species’ conﬂicts, cooperative associations, and moral dilemmas. But, upon study,
one has to be surprised by how often the basic forces of social tension in human life
have deeply and inexorably shaped biological history. The lessons drawn from such
similarity are, certainly, points of debate. But before we can consider the debate, we
need some facts to set a common ground for discussion.
I organize biological aspects of cooperation along the lines of the four major
forces that shape the nature of conﬂict and cooperation among self interested
individuals.Thoseforcesare correlationbetweensocial partners,repressionofcom-
petition, correlated interests between actor and recipient, and synergism. In this
section, I consider the role played by each of those forces in the history of life.Evolutionary Foundations of Cooperation and Group Cohesion 17
The broad topic is, of course, too great to cover fully. So I use a few examples to
illustrate the key points.
4.1 Correlated Behavior and the Tragedy of the Commons
The tragedy of the commonsarises because self interested individualsgain by com-
peting against neighbors. Rapacious individuals outcompete their neighbors and
gain a larger share of the local resource. But rapacious behavior depletes the local
resource in a way that reduces the long-term yield, causing harm to all members of
thegroup.Amechanismthatcausescorrelationinbehaviorbetweengroupmembers
favors prudent behavior, greater sustainable productivity, and beneﬁt to all group
members.
I applied the tragedy of the commons to problems in biology (Frank 1995a,
1996b), extending a long history of work on group selection (Hamilton 1967, 1972,
1975; Lewontin 1970; Leigh 1977, 1991; Wilson 1980; Colwell and Wilson 1981;
Szathm´ ary and Demeter 1987). My work arose from study of biological problems
such as the sex ratio of progeny produced by mothers within small isolated groups
andthe amountof harma parasitecausesto its host.I discusshowthese applications
and related problemshave grown into a major ﬁeld of study in evolutionary biology
(Rankin et al. 2007).
4.1.1 Sex Ratio: The Production of Males as a Competitive Trait
In almost all animals, females produce babies and males do little except compete,
mate, and provide sperm. With regard to reproduction, females are productive and
males are competitive. In some animals, males contribute more that just matings,
and the situation is more complex. But the vast majority animals follow the sim-
ple dichotomy. For example, one can think of most male insects as the mother’s
competitive winged sperm.
Consider the male-female distinction from a mother’s point of view. She can
make a daughter, who produces babies. Or she can make a son, who competes with
other males for matings but produces nothing directly.
A mother’sinvestment in sons is an investmentin a trait to compete against other
mothers in the local mating group (Hamilton 1967). The more a mother invests in
sons, the more grandchildren she will have through her sons. Those extra grand-
children come at the expense of reduced numbers of grandchildrenthrough sons by
other mothers in the group, because the total number of grandchildren is ﬁxed by
the number of productive daughters that are made.
Thisproblemofallocationofresourcestocompetitivesonsis formallyequivalent
to the tragedy of the commonsproblemthat I introducedearlier in (6) (Frank 2006).
In particular, suppose a mother allocates a fraction I of her reproductive resources
to sons and a fraction 1   I to daughters. Assume that, in a local group, daughters18 S.A. Frank
andsonsgrowupandmatewitheachother,andthenthemateddaughtersdisperseto
ﬁndnewreproductiveopportunities–apatternofmatinganddispersalthatoccursin
many insects (Hamilton 1967). In a local group, suppose that, on average, mothers
allocate G of their resources to sons and 1   G to daughters.
A mother’s payoff is the combination of her success through her sons, Ws,a n d
her success throughher daughters,Wd, yieldingtotal success as W D WsCWd.F o r
sons, the payoff follows exactly the tragedy of the commons expression for payoff
in (6) as
Ws D
I
G
.1   G/: (21)
The ﬁrst term, I=G, accounts for the relative success of a mother through the mat-
ings obtained by her sons. For example, a mother may make K babies of which a
fraction I are sons, giving her KI sons. In the group, there are N mothers who, on
average, each make KG sons. So the fraction of all males in the group by the focal
mother is I=.NG/. Those males compete for matings among the local resource, the
KN.1   G/ daughters produced by all mothers in the local group. Combining the
terms and dropping K as an arbitrary proportionality constant gives Ws. Success
through daughters is the number of daughters produced by a mother, K.1   I/,a n d
againwe dropK as a proportionalityconstant.Combiningsuccessthroughsons and
daughters yields total payoff as (Hamilton 1967)
W D
I
G
.1   G/C 1   I: (22)
We apply the same methods used to obtain (8). The solution is z  D .1   r/=2,
where z  is the fraction of resources a mother allocates to sons such that, if nearly
everyone adopts this behavior, no behavior that deviates from it can obtain a higher
payoff, and r is the correlation in the sex ratio produced by mothers within a local
group (Frank 1985, 1998).
The solution parses more easily when we write the best allocation to sons and
daughters as a ratio 1 r W 1Cr. Here, the term 1 r for male allocation arises
from the equivalence between male allocation and the tragedy of the commons
(Frank 2006). Sons are the direct expression of a mother’s competition against
neighboring mothers. Sons are made at the expense of daughters. Daughters con-
tribute to the success of all mothers in the group by providing mates for those
mothers’ sons.
The term 1Cr for the relative value of female allocation arises as follows.
Each extra daughter made by a mother contributes to the mother’s success directly
through the grandchildrenproducedby the daughter – the valuation of one. In addi-
tion, an extra daughterprovidesan extra mate to malesin the local group.That extra
mate for sons accrues to the strategy pursued by the focal mother in proportion to
the correlationbetweenthe mother’s strategy(hersex ratio) andthe averagestrategy
in the local group (Frank 1998).
This sex ratio model makes a simple qualitative prediction. As the correlation
between mothers declines, motherscompete more intensely with each other by rais-
ing their relative allocation to sons. If we assume that behavioral correlation in aEvolutionary Foundations of Cooperation and Group Cohesion 19
small group arises mainly from a mother’s correlation to herself, then in the sim-
plest case r D 1=N ,w h e r eN is the number of mothers in the local group. This
gives us Hamilton’s (1967) famous model of the sex ratio under local competition
for mates. With this expression, r declines as the number of mothers in the group,
N, rises. So the prediction becomes: as N rises, the fraction of males produced by
mothers should rise.
Many studies show that as more mothers contribute to a local group, the com-
petitive allocation to sons rises (Godfray and Werren 1996; Hardy 2002). My own
study on ﬁg wasps providesa simple and directdemonstration(Frank 1985,see also
Herre 1985). In the species I studied, a mated ﬁg wasp female gets inside a ﬁg, lays
her eggs,and dies. More than onemated female may lay her eggswithin a ﬁg during
a short window of a few days. About 4 weeks later, the male offspring emerge ﬁrst
within the dark cavity in the center of the ﬁg. The males mate with the quiescent
females. After a few days, one of the males chews a tunnel through the wall of the
ﬁg, stimulating the mated females to emerge, exit, and ﬁnd another ﬁg to start the
cycle anew.
Fig biology imposes exactly the life course assumed by the sex ratio model of
local mating and competition among males (Hamilton 1979). To test the theory, I
manipulated the number of mothers that enter each ﬁg. Do these tiny mothers, each
less than 2mm, detect the number of other mothers in the dark ﬁg cavity and adjust
their allocation to competitive sons? Figure 2 shows that they do.
18 7 6 5 4 3 2
45
39
33
27
21
15
9
3
Foundresses per fig
P
e
r
c
e
n
t
 
m
a
l
e
s
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X X
X X X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
Fig. 2 Sex ratio of ﬁg wasps. Foundresses per ﬁg represents the number of mothers laying eggs
in each ﬁg. The numbers of foundresses were controlled experimentally. Each “X”m a r k st h es e x
ratio of all foundresses in a single ﬁg. The percent males rises with the number of foundresses,
matching the tragedy of the commons prediction that mothers increase their competitive allocation
to sons in response to an increase in the number of other mothers that compete in the local group.
Redrawn from Frank (1985)20 S.A. Frank
4.1.2 Parasite Virulence: A General Model for Prudent Versus Rapacious
Exploitation of Resources
Some parasites exploit their hosts in a prudent way, taking the resources that they
need without causing noticeable damage. Prudent exploitation yields sustainable
beneﬁts to the parasite as long as the host remains healthy. Other parasites attack
their host more quickly and vigorously. Rapid exploitation may allow the parasites
to achieve higher reproductive rates, but damage to the host reduces the parasites’
opportunity for sustainable yield (Frank 1996b).
Following this economic line of thought, each parasite faces a tradeoff when
increasing the rate at which host resources are used. Greater exploitation has the
beneﬁt of more rapid reproduction and transmission to new hosts, but carries the
cost of reducing the host’s ability to procure more resources in the future. For each
host-parasite interaction, there may be a particular optimum schedule of host uti-
lization that maximizes the parasites’ balance between rapid transmission and the
time before the host dies (Fenner et al. 1956; Levin and Pimental 1981; Anderson
and May 1982; Levin 1983).
One process missing from the tradeoff between transmission and virulence con-
cerns the “social” aspect of parasite interactions. Suppose that prudent exploitation
of a host maximizes a parasite’s reproduction. Natural selection then favors each
parasite, when alone in a host, to follow the prudent strategy. There is, however, a
problem when two or more parasites with different strategies occupy the same host.
If one strategy extracts host resources rapidly and reproduces quickly, then the host
may die in a short time. A prudent strategy would have relatively low reproduction
when paired in a host with a rapacious strategy because, for both strategies, the host
is short-lived, and the rapacious strategy reproduces more rapidly than the prudent
one. This is the tragedy of the commons.
Correlation in behavior between members of a group mitigates the tragedy of the
commons. In biology, the correlation typically arises by genetic relatedness within
a group. In the case of parasite virulence, the prediction is that more related par-
asites within a host will behave more prudently, competing less intensely among
themselves and causing less harm to the host (Hamilton 1972; Bremermann and
Pickering 1983;Frank 1992, 1996b).Figure 3 supports the predicted trend: reduced
correlation among parasites increases the damage caused to the host.
The pattern in Fig.3 leaves open the issue of whether competition between unre-
lated parasite lineagesplays a direct role in causing harm to the host. de Roode et al.
(2005) showed that, in the parasite that causes malaria, the more competitive par-
asite lineages did outcompete other parasites within the host and did cause greater
harm to the host. This study of the malaria parasite ties the direct competition over
local resources to the harm caused to the public good – the health of the host that
provides resources to the parasites.
The problem of parasite virulence captures well the essence of many biolog-
ical examples of the tragedy of the commons (Frank 1996b). For example, the
most primitive cells probably contained several molecules that could make copies
of themselves – the primitive genes. Each trait of those replicating molecules wasEvolutionary Foundations of Cooperation and Group Cohesion 21
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Fig. 3 Virulence of nematodes infecting ﬁg wasps. The ﬁg wasps I described in the sex ratio
section often carry parasitic nematodes. Herre (1993) studied how muchharm these parasitic nema-
todes cause to their hosts. He predicted that greater mixing between nematode lineages would
reduce the correlation of behavior (relatedness) within hosts and lead to greater virulence. The
data support the prediction. Here, multi-foundress broods measure the fraction of ﬁgs in which
more than one wasp entered. The more often multiple foundresses enter a ﬁg, the more often the
nematode lineages will likely mix, reducing within-host correlation. Herre measured virulence by
1   fi=fu,w h e r efi and fu are the number of babies produced by infected and uninfected wasps,
respectively. Lower productivity of infected wasps corresponds to higher virulence. Redrawn from
Herre (1993)
selected accordingto the balance between individualbeneﬁt from rapid exploitation
of local resources and group beneﬁt from prudent exploitation of local resources.
In other words, the problem of cooperation versus conﬂict in groups arose in the
earliest stages of biological history.
4.1.3 Scale of Competition and the Role of Group Productivity
I presenteda simpletragedyofthe commonsmodelin (6). Inthatmodel,individuals
can potentially gain by restraining competition in order to enhance the productivity
of their group. Individuals in more productive groups beneﬁt by getting a piece of a
greater local resource, even if their piece may be smaller than their neighbors’.
This simple model for the tragedy of the commons makes implicit assump-
tions about how individuals compete and how we measure success. In evolutionary
models, we generally measure the success of an individual relative to some base
population, because we are interested in whether a behavior is gaining or losing in
frequency in response to its success relative to other behaviors in the comparison
population.
Suppose we regard the local group as part of a broader population, and we
measure the success of each individual relative to the broader population. Then a
cooperative individual can gain in the population by trading a smaller share of the
local resource in return for a greatertotal value of the local resource.In other words,
a prudentgroupgainsgreatertotalproductivity,beneﬁtingallmembersofthegroup.22 S.A. Frank
The interpretation of differential group productivity beneﬁting members of prudent
groups matches the tragedy of the commons model that I gave earlier. In this case,
an individual’s success is measured relative to the broad population composed of
many local groups.
But what if an individual’s success is measured relative only to other members
of its local group? For example, if there is no competition between members of dif-
ferent groups, then each individual’s relative success arises only from its advantage
or disadvantage compared to its neighbors in its local group (Wilson et al. 1992;
Taylor 1992a, b; Queller 1994).
We can, in general, deﬁne the problem by the scale of competition (Frank 1998).
Let the scale of competition,s, be the probability that an individual ultimately com-
petes against and measures its relative success against only local group members,
and 1 s be the probabilitythat an individual ultimately competes against and mea-
sures its success against members of the broader population. The base population
for measuring success determines how a particular level of success translates into
change in the frequency of a behavioral strategy.
With this deﬁnition for the scale of competition,we can extend the tragedyof the
commons model in (6) to
W D
I
G
 
1   G
s.1  G/C .1   s/.1   z /
!
; (23)
where z  is the average level of competitive behavior in the population, I D z  C ı
is the deviation from the average by a randomly chosen focal individual, and G D
z  C rı is the deviation of the group average by the focal individual’s local group.
By following the approach given earlier, we can ﬁnd the value of z  that, once
adopted by the population, cannot be beat. Because z , the level of competitiveness
of individuals, varies in this model between zero and one, we can write 1   z  for
the level of individual cooperation, yielding
1   z  D r
  1   s
1   rs
 
; (24)
where r is the correlationin behavior within local groups. Increased behavioral cor-
relation, r, favors cooperation. By contrast, increased local competition, s, reduces
cooperation. An individual cannot gain by providing beneﬁt to a neighbor if the
individual’s ultimate success is measured only against neighbors. Cooperation can
increase only to the extent that an individual ultimately competes against and
measures success against members of other groups.
Grifﬁn et al. (2004) studied how behavioral correlation and the scale of com-
petition jointly determine cooperative behavior in bacteria. Pathogenic bacteria
often face iron limitation when living within a host; hosts often withhold iron as a
defenseagainstbacteria.Somebacteriacansecretea molecule–asiderophore–thatEvolutionary Foundations of Cooperation and Group Cohesion 23
scavenges iron from the host. The bacteria then take up siderophore-ironcomplexes
to overcome their deﬁciency.
Siderophore production is a public good: costly for individuals to produce and
equally beneﬁcial for all members of the local group. In particular, any member
of the local group can take up a siderophore-iron complex independently of who
originally secreted the siderophore.
Grifﬁnetal.experimentallyvariedbehavioralcorrelationbychangingtheamount
of mixing between different bacterial clones. Relatively pure clones cause high
behavioral correlation through genetic similarity. Mixed clones have lower behav-
ioral correlation because of greater genetic diversity. They varied the scale of
competition by altering the constraint placed on the contribution of local groups
to the following generation. If all groupscontribute equally by constraint, then indi-
viduals compete only locally within their group, and the scale of competition is
entirely local. If groups contribute in proportion to their productivity, then individ-
uals compete fully with members of other groups, and the scale of competition is
global.
The experiment set the conditions that determine behavioral correlation and the
scale of competition. Then, over time, the evolutionary change in populations was
followed with regard to siderophore production, which measures production of a
public good and the degree of local cooperation. Figure 4 shows that the exper-
iment supports the predictions of (24): greater behavioral correlation and global
competition increase cooperation.
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Fig. 4 Evolutionary change in siderophore production. Time moves from left to right, each unit
representing 1 day and one round of mixing of the bacteria to impose either local or global com-
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4.2 Repression of Competition
Correlated behaviors align interests and favor reduced competition. But highly
cooperative behavior often occurs in nature with little correlation in the intrinsic
tendency of individuals. To achieve that high level of cooperation in the absence of
intrinsic correlation,there must be some force extrinsic to each individualthat tends
to align interests and behaviors (Frank 2003).
Reduced opportunity for competition can align interests. If an individual cannot
compete against neighbors, then that individual can increase its own success only
by enhancing the efﬁciency and productivity of its group (Leigh 1977; Alexander
1979). In the ﬁrst example, a randomization process assigns success to individuals
independently of their behavior within the local group, preventing any individual
from gaining by competing against neighbors. In the second example, power-
ful individuals within the local group repress competition between lower ranking
individuals; such policing of competition appears to play a key role in social
integration within the group. In the ﬁnal example, one species domesticates and
essentially enslaves another species. The master species gains by preventing com-
petition between enslaved members of the group, in order to prevent wasted energy
devoted to internal competition.
4.2.1 Randomization and Fairness
Sexual reproduction mixes the genes from two parents to make an offspring. Each
parentcontributesonehalf ofthe genes. Meiosisis the processbywhich eachparent
selects one half of its own genes for transmission to the child. Biologists often refer
to the process as “fair meiosis,” to emphasize that each copy of a gene has an equal
chance of being chosen. This randomization process means that no gene copy can
gain an advantage over other gene copies in being transmitted to the offspring.
With no opportunity for local competition, all gene copies gain only with the
enhanced success of the whole group (Leigh 1971). In this case, we call the group
of the genes the “genome.” The unity of the genome, and thus the unity of the
individual, is so nearly complete that one often thinks of the genome in a unitary
wayratherthanas acollectionofcooperatinggenes(MaynardSmith andSzathm´ ary
1995). However, competition between gene copies does occur in nature, in which
one gene copy increases its chance of getting transmitted to the offspring at the
expense of other gene copies (Crow 1979).
Competition between gene copies reminds one that the reproductivefairness and
the near unity of the genome evolved in the face of competitive pressure between
neighbors. The puzzle concerns how the process of natural selection, acting on
the interests of the individual gene copies, led to particular biochemical mech-
anisms that typically repress internal competition (Frank 1995a), and how those
mechanisms can sometimes be subverted by certain competitive types.
This example shows that the very foundations of sex, reproduction, and the
genetictransmission of informationarose fromthe groupcohesionof a collectionofEvolutionary Foundations of Cooperation and Group Cohesion 25
genes. That cohesion was created by processes that repress internal competition and
bind the interests of the separate genes to the group(MaynardSmith and Szathm´ ary
1995).
As I mentioned, the cohesion of the genome often appears so complete that we
use the word “individual” to refer to a single genome – a single collection of genes
in an organism. But that “individual” is a constructed group, cohesive only because
of the high reliability of the internal mechanisms that ensure reproductive fairness
among gene copies.
The occasional gene copies that subvert these fairness mechanisms and outcom-
pete neighbors emphasize that unity in biology must always be constructed and
maintained. Such unity arises solely from self interested actors. The system of
cohesion built by those self interested actors must enforce against the competitive
tendencies of those same actors. And so it always goes: conﬂict and cooperation in
constant tension and never separable.
4.2.2 Policing and Repression of Competition
Individualsin a group may preventothers from competing.Such repression of com-
petition by third-party policing reduces opportunity for individuals to gain at the
expense of their neighbors. Once again, in the absence of opportunity to outcom-
pete a neighbor,an individual can increase its own success only by enhancinggroup
efﬁciency and productivity.
Policing of competition can be a very effective mechanism to promote group
cohesion.However,policingcompetitionbetweenotherscanbedangerousorcostly.
Whyshouldaself interestedactortakeonthecostsofthepolicingrole?InSect. 3.2,
I showed the conditions under which an individual may gain more by its beneﬁt
from living in a more productive group than it loses by the costs of policing. I also
mentionedhowthetheorypredictsaninterestingasymmetrywithregardtopolicing:
those individualswith relativelygreater vigoror resourcesare favored to take on the
policing role, whereas those with relatively lower vigor or resources do not gain
from policing (Frank 1996c). Thus, the theory predicts that the relatively powerful
individuals impose social control on the group when effective mechanisms exist for
dominant individuals to repress competition and promote group cohesion.
Flacketal.(2005a,b)studiedpolicingandgroupcohesioninpigtailedmacaques.
Dominant males intervene to control disputes between pairs of lower ranking indi-
viduals. Those policing acts usually do not favor one competitor over the other, but
rather the intervention puts an end to the conﬂict.
Flack et al. (2005a, b) analyzed the consequences of policing interventions for
various aspects of group cohesion. They compared two situations in a semi-natural
captive colony. In the baseline case, the dominant males were present and acted
in their normal way to settle disputes. In the “knockout” experiment, Flack et al.
removed the dominant males and placed them just outside a wall that bounded
the colony. The dominant males were visible to the colony members but could not
intervene.26 S.A. Frank
When policing males were removed, the amount of aggressive behavior in the
colony increased. Measures of aggression included initiation of conﬂicts, inten-
sity of conﬂicts, biting, and joining a conﬂict. With the rise in conﬂict, there was
also a decline in afﬁliative behaviors: reconciliation, play, grooming, and physical
proximity. From these observations, Flack et al. (2005a) concluded:
The extent to which policing is important to organizational robustness is surprising con-
sidering that actual policing behavior occurs relatively rarely. This suggests that the simple
presence of individuals responsible for conﬂict management can change the way group
members are willing to interact with one another.
Inmyownwork(Frank1996c),Idevelopedthetheoreticalpredictionwithregard
to policing when individuals vary in vigor or resources:
Small variations in individual vigour or resources can lead to large variations in individual
contributions to policing the group. Stronger individuals often invest all of their excess
resources into policing, but weaker individuals do not contribute to group cohesion.
Flack et al. (2005b) directly addressed this prediction:
The primary ﬁnding of this study is that heterogeneities in power, by producing hetero-
geneities in the cost of conﬂict management for individuals, lead to heterogeneities in the
tendency to police.
In pigtailed macaques, the well endowed make essentially all the investment in
social control.
In a subsequent paper, Flack et al. (2006) concluded that policing by dominant
individuals plays a key role in group cohesion:
We observe that when policing is operational, group members build larger social networks
characterized by greater partner diversity and increased potential for socially positive conta-
gion and cooperation. Without policing, high conﬂict frequency and severity leads to more
conservative social interactions and a less integrated society.
4.2.3 Domestication and Repression of Competition
Humans have domesticated various animal and plant species for food production.
Ants began farming much earlier – about 50 million years ago (Mueller 2002).
Fungus growing ants collect plant material to feed their crops. The ants weed
their gardens to protect against fungal parasites that specialize in attacking fun-
gus gardens. The ants also grow specialized cultures of bacteria on their bodies in
order to use the antibiotic secretions producedby their partner bacteria (Zhanget al.
2007). The antibiotics protect the fungal gardens from bacterial diseases.
Domesticated fungal species were once wild, free living species. New domesti-
cates carrywith themtheir ownevolvedtendenciesforcompetitionin localgroups–
theirtragedyofthecommons–inwhichsuchcompetitionreducestheefﬁciencyand
productivity of the domesticates.
I developed the general prediction that nonhuman masters gain by repress-
ing competition among domesticates in order to elicit the most efﬁcient domesticEvolutionary Foundations of Cooperation and Group Cohesion 27
productivity (Frank 1996a). In natural, unregulated situations, mixture between
genetically unrelated strains often leads to greater competition between individuals
and a decline in productivity. Such competition develops between mixed lineages
because mixture reduces the behavioral correlation between individuals. Following
this logic,the easiest way for ant farmersto reduceconﬂict betweenfungaldomesti-
cates would be to prevent mixing of fungal lineages in their gardens. Homogeneous
domesticates have high correlation in their cooperative tendencies, leading to an
intrinsic tendency to reduce competition and enhance group productivity.
Ants do in fact prevent mixing of domesticate fungal lineages (Bot et al. 2001;
Muelleretal. 2004;Zhangetal. 2007).Whena newbornqueenleavesher birthplace
to found a new colony, she brings with her the fungallineage from her natal colony.
The fungi produce chemicals that inhibit growth by competing lineages; the ants
spread those anti-competitor chemicals in their feces, which fertilize the growing
fungal garden.
4.3 Correlated Interests
Anindividualmayvaluepayofftoanotherindividual.Suchotherregardingbehavior
arises commonly in biology from genetic relatedness. For example, life depends on
the regard a parent has for its offspring.
In biology,we can tally the payoffto a parentfor its variousbehaviorsdirected at
offspring.We ﬁrst count the beneﬁts of those behaviorsfor the offspring discounted
by the genetic correlation between parent and offspring. We then subtract off the
direct cost of the behaviors for the parent. This calculation yields Hamilton’s rule,
by which a behavior is favored when rb  c>0 ,w h e r er is the genetic correlation
(or regression) between actor and recipient, b is the beneﬁt to the recipient, and c is
the cost to the actor – see (15).
The actor’s valuation of the recipient in proportion to genetic correlation arises
from the fact that transmission of strategies through time ultimately determines the
evolutionarydynamicsofbehavior.Arecipientofabehaviorcarriestheactor’sdevi-
ationfromtheaveragestrategyinproportiontothegeneticcorrelationbetweenactor
and recipient.
Other forces may sometimes affect the valuation of a recipient by the actor. For
example,therecipientmayreturnabeneﬁcialbehaviorata latertime (Trivers1971).
In this case, valuation of another arises as an investment in an expected future pay-
back. Most often, however, other regarding behavior in biology arises from genetic
relatedness.
Parental altruism toward offspringoccurs so widely in nature that I will not elab-
orate further on that case. Instead, I focus on two interesting examples in which
individuals weigh their comparative regard for different classes of genetic relatives.
The comparative aspect highlights the quantitative nature by which an actor regards
the payoff to others.28 S.A. Frank
4.3.1 Competition for Being the Queen
In many social insect colonies, a newborn female may develop into a reproductive
queen or a partially sterile worker (Wilson 1971). A queen directly produces off-
spring; a worker helps to raise sisters and brothers. A newborn female often would
gain more by developinginto a queen rather than a worker. Here, I measure success
by the biological standard of genetic contribution to future generations. I tabulate
total genetic success by the effect of a behavior on direct reproduction and on the
reproduction of genetic relatives weighted by the genetic relatedness of actor to
recipient.
The queen or the older workers usually control the fate of newborn females –
development into either the queen or worker caste. The elders control the caste
of newborns by manipulating offspring size, by varying chemical stimulus, and
by altering the provisioning of food. The elders’ control over caste represses
competition between newborns over development into queens.
In a particular type of social bee, elders do not coerce the caste of newborns
(Wenseleers and Ratnieks 2004). Each newborn female may develop unconstrained
into either a queen or a worker. However, the number of available opportunities for
newbornqueensto leada colonyislimited. Thosewhodevelopinto queenscompete
with each other for those limited slots. Only a small number of queens succeed in
this competition; the losers die and do not contribute to the colony productivity.
The competition between newborn queens causes a tragedy of the commons
(Wenseleers and Ratnieks 2004). To increase group efﬁciency and productivity,
the colony should avoid costly overproduction of queens, most of whom die in
competition with their neighbors. Those queens who die in competition could
have developed into workers who contribute to common productivity. However,
individualsmay gain by competing for the extra individual payoff of being a queen.
The calculation of payoffs for being a worker or queen is more complex in this
case than for the simple tragedy of the commons models I discussed earlier. In this
case, we must account for other regarding valuations ascribed to different kinds of
genetic relatives. In particular, we want to know how the behavioral choice of being
a queen or a worker affects others in the colony, and how the actor, faced with the
choice of alternative development, regards those who are affected by the choice.
A specialaspectofbees,ants,andwaspsarisesfromtheirasymmetricinheritance
system. A mother’s unfertilized egg develops into a son; her fertilized egg develops
into a daughter. Queens mate with males and produce both unfertilized sons and
fertilized daughters. Workers do not mate, but can lay unfertilized sons.
Workers will typically be offspring of the queen. The workers help to rear the
new eggs laid in the colony. Most of those new eggs will be laid by the queen and
will be the workers’sisters and brothers.However,some ofthe workerswill directly
lay their own sons. Thus, in rearing new eggs, a worker will also be helping to rear
some of her sisters’ sons – that is, her nephews.
Here is a central point: a female is more closely related to her nephewthan to her
brother because of the peculiar asymmetry in inheritance (Hamilton 1972). So the
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to rear the eggs produced by the colony. The more nephews produced directly by
her sister-workers, the more a female values the eggs she helps to rear as a worker.
Now we return to the key behavioral choice. A newborn female can become a
queen and rear sons and daughters. Or she can become a worker and rear sisters,
brothers, and nephews. The greater the ratio of nephews to brothers, the greater the
valuation of being a worker via accounting for genetic regard for others.
Thus, we come to a simple prediction (Wenseleers and Ratnieks 2004).The frac-
tion of females who develop into queens should decline as the amount of egg laying
by workers rises. To state the reasoning again: more egg laying by workers means
that a worker will raise an increased ratio of nephews to brothers. A worker val-
ues a nephew more highly than a brother. As the fraction of nephews increases, the
relativevalueofbeinga workerrises, andtherelativegainof competingfora queen-
ship drops compared to the expected gain of being a worker. Figure 5 shows data
that support the prediction. More egg laying by workers is associated with a lower
fraction of newborn females developing into queens.
4.3.2 Worker Valuation of Egg Production by Other Workers
I stated that, in the bees, ants, and wasps, a sister is more closely related to her
nephew than to her brother. This asymmetry occurs when a colony has a single
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queen who mates with only one male, as in the particular bees discussed in the
previousexample.However,in some other species, a queen may mate several times,
or there may be multiple queens. The number of queens, the number of times a
queen mates, and the level of inbreeding affect the asymmetry in relatedness of a
worker to nephews and brothers (Hamilton 1972).
We can avoid complexity by considering a simple prediction. When a worker is
more related to the sons of other workers than to sons produced by the queen, she
will allow other workers to produce sons without interference. By contrast, when
a worker is more related to the queen’s sons than to sons produced by other work-
ers, she will interfere with reproductionby other workers (Wenseleers and Ratnieks
2006).
Figure 6 supports the prediction that relatedness asymmetry determines worker
behavior. When workers are more related to other workers’ sons than to the queen’s
sons, then the percentage of males produced by workers rises signiﬁcantly above
zero. By contrast, when workers are more related to the queen’s sons than to other
workers’ sons, production of sons by workers is almost always very close to zero.
In this case, the workers prevent other workers from producing sons by eating the
eggs laid by workers.
These two examples from social insects show that the biological theory of
other regarding valuation based on genetic kinship provides precise quantitative
understanding of behavior.
–0.15 –0.10 –0.05 0 0.15 0.10 0.05
Relatedness difference between
workers’ and queen’s sons
%
 
o
f
 
m
a
l
e
s
 
w
o
r
k
e
r
s
’
 
s
o
n
s
0
100
10
1
Fig. 6 Relatedness asymmetry determines whether a worker allows other workers to reproduce.
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queen’s sons than to the workers’ sons. Positive values mean the opposite. The height of each
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4.4 Synergism and the Origin of Mutually Beneﬁcial Behaviors
Thepriorexamplesconcernedbehaviorsthatcanbedirectlyobserved:sexratio,par-
asite virulence, or tolerance of egg laying by sister-workers. By contrast, synergism
concerns the origin of mutually beneﬁcial behaviors at some time in the past.
Mutually beneﬁcial behaviors often require complementary specialization. Such
specializationfrequentlydoesnotexist in advanceof the cooperativeventure(Frank
1995b). So the ﬁrst problem concerns how the mutually beneﬁcial behavior got
started and became sufﬁciently integrated to provide fully synergistic beneﬁts.
As parties come to depend on each other’s complementary specializations, they
may over time become mutually dependent. If so, then a second problem concerns
theirreversibilityofsynergisticbehavior:neitherpartycansucceedwithoutthepart-
nership. Put another way, as each player becomes adjusted to the presence of the
other, the other takes on the role of an essential part of the environment without
which the individual cannot succeed. Indeed, the integration can become so com-
plete that it is hard to see the past history – in the present, the players have become
so completely interdependent that we tend to view them as a unit.
Much of the deep structure of life may have followed a path in which sepa-
rate entities interacted synergistically and became mutually dependent. Synergism
may be the most important of topics in the study of group integration, but it is also
the most difﬁcult of topics to analyze. Past separation becomes hidden in present
integration.
4.4.1 The Origin of Integrated Individuals
It is difﬁcult to identify past synergism in current behaviors. So I will start with a
theoretical example. The example concerns how the earliest kind of life may have
become integrated into more complex cooperative groups.
Life depends on molecules that copy themselves. Those molecules that replicate
at the highest rate increase in abundance. If the error rate in replication is sufﬁ-
ciently low, then a progeny molecule is mostly like its parent, and carries the same
information that provided a replicative edge to its parent (Eigen 1971).
All of life became structured into cells early in history. A cell contains the infor-
mational molecules that copy themselves. Those informational molecules direct the
biochemical physiology of the cell. The physiology runs the program by which the
cell acquires resources, protects itself against perturbation, and copies its informa-
tional molecules.
A cell is a complex cooperative consortium of multiple informationalmolecules,
each informational component directing a part of the physiology needed to run
the collaborative enterprise. Because cells require complex integration of compo-
nents, simple informationalmoleculesthat copy themselves must have precededthe
earliest cells (Eigen and Schuster 1979; Maynard Smith 1979).32 S.A. Frank
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Fig. 7 Thresold model for the origin and evolution of synergistic cooperation. Individuals of pop-
ulation 1 have a trait, T1, that enhances the reproductive rate of members of population 2, but the
trait that beneﬁts the partner also reduces the actor’s own ﬁtness. Likewise, members of popula-
tion 2 have a trait, T2, that enhances the reproduction of individuals of population 1 at a cost to the
actor. Larger values of T provide more beneﬁt to the partner at a higher cost to the donor. When
both populations have low trait values, as would be expected when the partners ﬁrst meet, natu-
ral selection continually pushes the traits to lower values. If, however, the pair of traits is above a
threshold upon ﬁrst meeting, then cooperation can increase because of synergistic feedback. Corre-
lation in the traits between populations increases the probability that a particular group will have a
pair of individuals above the threshold. Such correlation may arise from spatial associations. From
Frank (1995b)
How can different kinds of self interested molecules come to be associated in a
mutually beneﬁcial synergism?
It is easy enough to imagine that if two different types express complementary
information, then their interaction produces synergistic beneﬁts. But how did the
two types come to express complementary information, if each initially evolved in
isolation? The problem turns on a threshold, as in the earlier theoretical section on
synergism (Frank 1995b). If both populations of alternative molecules express, on
average, a level of complementary information above some threshold, synergism
follows easily. But the initial state is inevitably below the threshold.
Figure 7 shows this threshold modelfor synergism.Once both partnersare above
the threshold, mutually beneﬁcial interactions strongly enhance the cooperative
traits. After enhancement by positive feedback, the partners may be investing heav-
ily in traits that beneﬁt each other in order to receive enhanced return beneﬁts. At
thatpoint,the partnersmaybecomefullydependentoneachotherforsurvival.Once
above the threshold, the likely path is: complementation and positive feedback !
specialization ! irreversible transition to a highly integrated and cooperative state
(Eigen and Schuster 1979).
How can partners pass the threshold? Suppose, initially, that the average traits of
the two populations are below the threshold. However, there is variability in each
population. So, by chance, some pairs of individuals will be above the threshold.
Those chance pairs will do better than average, because they gain the synergistic
beneﬁt from their positive feedback on each other. Each will have more offspring
than average,spreadingthe cooperativetrait values in their populations.However,if
their progenyassociate randomly with partners, then on average they will be invest-
ing highly in cooperationbut will be matched with partners who do not reciprocate.
So those cooperative progeny will do less well than average, and no net progress in
cooperative evolution ensues.
Spatial associations may help (Axelrod and Hamilton 1981; Nowak et al. 1994).
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leave more progeny than average. If their progeny tend to associate rather than
mix randomly, then the synergism continues, and the paired lineages of cooperators
expand. The spatial association, extended over time, allows the cooperative pairing
to continue long enough to increase signiﬁcantly, possibly pushing the average trait
values over the threshold (Frank 1994a, 1995b). Once the average values pass the
threshold, both populations rapidly enhance their synergistic traits, and the spatial
associations are no longer required.
Cells are membrane bound structures that naturally impose spatial associations
(Maynard Smith and Szathm´ ary 1995). Perhaps the spatial associations imposed by
the early cells helped to push various biochemical synergisms over their coopera-
tive thresholds. As those thresholds were passed, the mutual dependence between
molecules became ﬁxed. At that point, the biochemical integration became so deep
that we would have a hard time recognizing the self interested histories behind the
cohesive group.
4.4.2 Irreversible Thresholds in the Social Evolution of Insect Colonies
Positive feedback, historical change, and irreversibility may often play important
roles in the evolution of complex and highly integrated groups. In this section, I
considerBourke’s(1999)interestinganalysisof socialinsectcolonies(Frank2003).
Although Bourke’s study transcends my simple models of synergism, his analysis
does emphasize strongly the role of positive feedback and irreversible thresholds in
cooperative evolution.
Bourke (1999) began by noting that, across different species of social insect,
small colonies tend to have relatively little morphological differentiation between
queens and workers. In addition, the workers have a relatively high degree of repro-
ductive potential. By contrast, large colonies tend to have strong morphological
differentiation between queens and workers and reduced reproductive potential of
the workers.
Alexanderetal.(1991)arguedthatinsmallcolonieseachworkerhasasigniﬁcant
probability of replacing the queen because there are relatively few competitors. By
contrast, workers in large colonies have relatively little chance of succeeding to
become queen. Thus, workers in large colonies are favored to reduce investment
in reproductive potential and become more specialized for their worker roles. This
reductionleadsto strongmorphologicaldifferentiationbetweenworkersandqueens
and low reproductive potential of workers. Absence of potential reproduction by
workers reduces conﬂict between workers and other colony members, because the
workers can enhance their ﬁtness mostly by increasing the success of the colony.
Ratnieks and Reeve (1992) suggested that worker control of reproduction by
other workers (policing) may be ineffective in small colonies. If there are few other
workers, then a single worker may be able to dominate her neighbors and succeed
in producingsons. As the numberof workersrises, policing becomesmore effective
because a single worker cannot dominate the collective.
Bourke (1999) combined these ideas to argue that positive feedbacks occur
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differentiationbetween workers and queens. As colony size rises, policing becomes
more effective, which favors reduced allocation to reproduction by workers. As
workersconcentratemoreontheir colony-productiveroles,conﬂictsubsidesandthe
colony becomes more efﬁcient. Greater efﬁciency may drive colonies to larger size,
further specializing workers for nonreproductive tasks and aligning the interests of
the workers with the interests of the colony.
5 Historical Analogy
The tension between conﬂict and cooperation of self interested actors runs deeply
throughout the history of life. The great puzzles turn on how cooperative and efﬁ-
cient groups arise solely through self interest. The same basic forces seem to occur
in both biology and in human affairs. I ﬁrst recap the biology, then comment on the
analogy to humans.
In biology, the tragedy of the commons rules in the absence of any special force
that promotes cooperation. We see the tragedy of self interest everywhere: in sex
ratios, in parasite virulence, in bacterial secretion of resource-acquiring molecules.
In all cases, each member of a group would do better by promoting group cohesion
and sharing in the beneﬁts of greater group efﬁciency. But, without some force that
curbs the free expression of self interest, competition within the group ultimately
plays against everyone’s interests.
Several forces in biology have overcome the tragedy to promote group cohe-
sion. Correlated behaviors tie the success of actors together by matching behavior
between partners and thus locking the success of the actor with its partner. If an
actor’s success is tied with its neighbors, then the value of group efﬁciency can
dominate the disruptive force of self interested competition. In biology, correlated
behavior most often arises by common genetics from shared ancestry – that is, by
interactionsbetween genetic kin.But any forcethat inducescorrelationcan have the
same effect.
Repression of competition within groups ties the interests of each individual to
the group. With no opportunity to outcompete neighbors, each individual can gain
only by promoting the efﬁciency and productivity of the group. Any process that
randomizes the share of group resources provided to each individual effectively
represses any opportunity for competition. The way that individuals divide their
genetic material for transmission to offspring arose from a process of randomiza-
tion, in which the probability that a particular gene passes to a child is determined
randomly. We call this process fair meiosis – the basis throughout much of life for
sex, reproduction, inheritance, and individuality.
Repression of competition may also be important at higher levels of social orga-
nization.I discussedonestudyof a primate,in whichdominantmalespoliceconﬂict
in the group. In the absence of those policing males, group cohesion deteriorated
signiﬁcantly. Effective policing of competition may be difﬁcult to achieve in many
biological settings. That difﬁculty explains why competition still rules much of life,
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Self interested valuation of others’ success arises naturally in biology through
genetic kinship. Observed patterns of behavior ultimately depend on the rate at
which competing behaviors are transmitted into the future. In this regard, an indi-
vidual is shaped by natural selection to value the success of another in proportion
to the correlation in their genetic tendency to pass the same behaviors on to future
generations.
Regard for kin sets the foundationof social behavior. It is the reason parentscare
for offspring, sterile honeybees raise their siblings, and nonreproductive skin cells
dietopromotethe successofspermoregg.Kincorrelationscanshapebehaviorwith
great precision. I illustrated that precision by the relative valuation a social insect
worker places on the queen’s sons versus the other workers’ sons. The class more
highlyvaluedswitchesdependingonhowmanytimesthe queenmates. Theworkers
switch their treatment accordingly. When the workers are more closely correlated
genetically with other workers’ sons, they tolerate production of those sons without
interference.By contrast,whenworkersaremorecloselycorrelatedgeneticallywith
the queen’s sons, they destroy the sons produced by other workers.
Finally, synergistic feedback between different aptitudes often provides bene-
ﬁt to both parties. I discussed how such synergism likely played a key role in the
earliest evolutionaryhistoryof life.At someearlystage, theremusthavebeena con-
sortium formed to produce the ﬁrst cells. That consortium arose between separate
molecules, each originally designed to replicate itself but not to interact coopera-
tively with other molecules. Some of those self interested replicators probably had
synergisticbiochemistry.The positivefeedbackscombinedwith spatialassociations
imposed by cellular boundaries set the ﬁrst great cooperative transition of life. I
also discussed how such synergisms between complementary aptitudes shaped the
historical trends to greater specialization and complexity in social insect colonies.
Correlated behaviors, repression of competition, other regarding valuation, and
synergistic gains between different aptitudes rule conﬂict and cooperation through-
out the history of life. The potential analogies with human behavior are clear.
But what is the value of such analogy between biology and human sociality? I
see two related beneﬁts. First, study of biology has greatly clariﬁed the logic of self
interest. I have, in this paper, outlined a rich theory of conﬂict and cooperation that
has succeededwell in explainingand in predictingdiverse behaviors.Many of those
ideas from biology have arisen independentlyin the theory of games or in studies of
human behavior. But the biological theory has a ﬁrmer conceptual foundation and
greater connection with observed phenomena.
Second, analogies from nature suggest hypotheses about the forces that have
shaped human societies. For example, Alexander (1979, 1987) has argued that
many aspects of human morality turn on reducing competition between neighbors
to promote group cohesion. Alexander developed his hypothesis from close study
of biology followed by analogy to human self interest.
How useful are such analogies in forming hypotheses about human sociality?
Certainly,bothlargemistakesandgreatinsightsmayfollowfromanalogy.Thus,one
can reasonably defend both caution and boldness. But caution cannot solve puzzles.
And many puzzles remain with regard to the forces that shape human cooperation
and competition.36 S.A. Frank
6 Historical Consequence
Historical analogy simply provides a source of ideas about how self interest plays
out in humansocieties. By contrast, historical consequencemeansthat humanshave
been shaped by the same forces that have operated throughout biological history.
Such historicalconsequencestill allows that humans are unique.From a strictly bio-
logical perspective, humans have particular attributes that set us apart. For example,
other animals have culture and specialized cognitive abilities, but the great devel-
opment of human culture and cognition deﬁne qualitative distinctions of human
sociality.
Thinking about historical consequence leads to obvious questions. How strongly
does genetic kinship shape behavior? How much does learning and culture alter the
dynamics of behavior? How much bias has biological history built into the way we
learn and transmit aspects of culture? How much does a history of group against
group competition align self interested tendencies with those of the group?
Biological history has had at least some consequential effects along these lines.
It simply does not make sense to suppose that history does not matter. But we still
do not know how to weigh various factors. How should we proceed to learn more?
One approach is to consider the following question (Alexander 1990): What was
the most important challenge to survival and reproduction that caused evolution to
transform our ancestors from something like a chimpanzee into a modern human?
To start, consider how biologists think about evolutionary transformation in
response to challenges of survival and reproduction. It is easier to see the structure
of the argument if we begin with a nonhuman example. I use kangaroos. I describe
the examplein detail, because it is essential to understandthe biologicalapproachto
analyzing evolutionary transformations. After I ﬁnish with the kangaroo example,
I apply the same logic to the evolutionary transformation of humans from their
ape ancestors.
Most of the 63 species of kangaroo make their living on the ground. Those
ground dwelling species include the large well-known hoppers. However, at least
10 species of kangaroo belong to a group that has become specialized for life in
the trees (Flannery et al. 1996). Adaptation for tree life led to several specialized
characteristics.
The key here is that a single broad challenge – moving from the ground into the
trees – explains a wide array of evolutionarychanges to deal with the challenge. We
will want to discuss whatsort of challengeand whatsort of changescharacterizethe
evolutionarytransformationofhumansfromapeancestors.Butﬁrst,letuseconsider
thekangaroos.Diamond(1997)hasdescribedthe characteristicchangesso well that
I quote directly:
The lifestyle of arboreal tree-kangaroos required them to reverse millions of years of kan-
garoo evolution in many respects: saving weight by a 25 per cent reduction in muscle mass;
developing long, strong, curved claws; big, powerful grasping forearms, and a rotator cuff
in the shoulder (shared with humans but not with other kangaroos or most other mammals)
to permit overhead use of the forearm; hind-feet that twist so that the soles can face each
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tufted with long fur in some species, used as a counterbalance in climbing and as a rudder
in ‘ﬂight’.
Those ‘ﬂights’ are actually jumps to the ground from a height of 20 metres or more in
the canopy. I know of no other big mammal that survives drops from such height:::the
animals’ bones, muscles and ligaments must have become modiﬁed to withstand such
shocks.
:::Faced withahard-to-digest, toxic,bulkyleaf dietoflow nutritionalvalue, tree-kangaroos
evolved a low metabolic rate. They decrease rather than increase their metabolic rate at low
ambient temperature; spend 90 per cent of their time ‘doing nothing’ (that is, sitting and
digesting); and have a complex stomach of several chambers, and regurgitate and rechew
food, like cows chewing the cud.
The logic for tree kangaroosis simple. They moved from the ground to the trees:
that move deﬁned the central evolutionary challenge. Nearly all of the particular
changes that separate tree kangaroos from those on the ground can be explained by
evolutionary response to the key challenge.
We need to consider two steps in order to apply this same logic to humans. First,
whataretheparticularcharacteristicsthatseparatehumansfromtheirapeancestors?
This list of characteristics deﬁnes the changes that need to be explained. People
argue over the exact limits of the differences, for example, how much symbolic
processing chimpanzees and gorillas can accomplish. But in the end, these are more
or less matters of fact that can be resolved by direct study.
Nonetheless, any direct statement about humans is likely to be controversial.
Here is just one example of certain potentially unique traits of humans (Alexander
1990):
Humans are the only mammal that lives in multi-male groups, in which conﬁdence (likeli-
hood) of paternity is high :::and the males are both extensively and complexly parental and
also extensively and complexly cooperative with one another (and in which, I speculate, the
males with the highest conﬁdence of paternity also tend to be the most cooperative.)
In the second step, we formulate a hypothesis: What is the central evolutionary
challengethatallowsustomakesenseoftheparticularevolutionarytransformations
that separate humans from ape ancestors?
Many theories have been proposed. Several emphasize the social environment.
Again, I give just one brief account to indicate the way in which one may argue.
Alexander (1990) gives a full scholarly discussion of past work and presents his
own views as follows:
:::Atsome point intheirevolutionhumans obviously begantocooperate tocompete:::this
intergroup competition becoming increasingly elaborate, direct, and continuous until it
achieved the ubiquity with which it has been exhibited in modern humans throughout
recorded history across the entire face of the earth:::This unique kind of within-species
balance-of-power race – involving, eventually, virtually all levels, or group sizes, within
societies – would be a perpetual or unending one:::in which rapidly appearing differences
in culture and technology could become signiﬁcant unbalancers that could accelerate the
process even further. It could be termed a case of “runaway social selection”:::[calling]
for adversarial and competing groups of humans to be central in creating the environ-
ment of brain and psyche selection. Unprecedented levels of cooperation within groups
could thereby be generated, as well as unprecedented kinds of between-group adversarial
relationships.38 S.A. Frank
These points establish the problem of historical consequence. One may follow
this problem in many directions. But, whatever direction, we can be sure that the
concepts of self interested cooperation will play an important role in framing the
key evolutionary challenge and the particular historical consequences for distinctly
human characteristics.
It is, of course, possible that multiple factors explain the human transformation –
different human characteristics may have different, unrelated explanations. But I
follow Michael Ghiselin (1969) in his analysis of Darwin’s greatness: above all,
Darwin succeeded by his stubborn belief that a few simple processes explain much
of the great complexity and variety of life. To discover a simple explanation, one
must assume that a simple explanation is possible.
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